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ABSTRACT 
The EU and the US have long called for the linking of trade and labour standards in trade 
agreements at both the multilateral and bilateral level. This article examines their practice of 
including labour provisions in trade agreements, with a particular focus on recent attempts to 
include such provisions on so-called “mega-regionals”, which were presented by their 
proponents as providing the benchmark for labour protection in future trade agreements. It 
discusses the rationale behind the inclusion of such provisions and their practical limitations, 
and examines the extent to which mega-regionals address these limitations. It is argued that 
whilst the EU and the US have been keen advocates for trade-labour linkages, there has also 
been an unwillingness to convert this rhetoric into practice, raising questions about the extent 
of their commitment to these values. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The requirement to adopt minimum labour standards is now standard practice in free 
trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated by major trading powers such as the EU and US. 
However, such practice has historically been contested by developing countries, who contend 
that the requirement to increase labour and social protection standards is designed to remove 
one of the few competitive advantages that developing countries have over developed 
countries in attracting foreign investment. More recently, the EU and the US have also sought 
to use so-called ‘mega-regionals’ such as the US-backed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to promote labour 
standards. This was a significant development in that their proponents were keen to stress that 
these agreements would set the template for labour protection provisions in FTAs. On the US 
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side, it was claimed that the TPP would contain the “strongest labour provisions of any trade 
agreement in history”1 and would provide “a benchmark for future agreements”.2 The EU 
claimed that the TTIP would provide an opportunity to negotiate “the most comprehensive set 
of fundamental international standards of labour rights […] ever contained in a trade 
agreement”.3 At the time of writing, the US has abandoned the TPP and TTIP negotiations 
have stalled to a halt. Nevertheless, the final text of the TTP and the negotiating drafts of the 
TTIP released by the EU can give us an indication of the grand visions espoused by these two 
trade powers for the future of labour provisions in trade agreements.  This paper aims to assess 
the labour provisions included in these mega-regionals to determine the extent to which these 
agreements mark a significant departure from past FTA practice. The paper posits that not 
only do both agreements not veer too far from established EU and US FTA templates, but also 
that they serve to illustrate that, as far as labour protection standards in EU and US FTAs are 
concerned, there is a significant disconnect between the rhetoric and practice. Whilst both 
players have been keen advocates of trade-labour linkages, and have included substantive 
labour-related obligations in their FTAs, they have also failed or proved themselves reluctant 
to implement and enforce such provisions in practice, raising the question of whether these 
provisions amount to little more than a veneer. Section 2 of the paper examines the rationale 
behind the push for the inclusion of labour protection standards in trade agreements as well as 
the ultimate rejection of such proposals at the multilateral level. Section 3 discusses the 
manner in which the EU and the US have sought to disseminate minimum labour protection 
standards through FTAs and examines the limits of this practice. Section 4 discusses how 
mega-regional FTAs, in particular the TTIP and the TPP, were packaged by their proponents 
as the most ambitious FTA provisions on labour issues to date, and analyses the extent to 
which this claim is justified in the text or proposed text of these agreements. This section will 
also discuss how the recent collapse of these agreements may affect the trade-labour linkage 
issues in future EU and US FTAs. 
 
II. RATIONALE FOR TRADE LABOUR LINKAGE 
The linking of trade and labour protection standards is typically based on economic 
and values-based arguments. From an economic perspective, there is the notion that 
divergences in labour standards between different countries lead to unfair competitive 
advantages in global trade. The ‘competitive advantage’ argument is that lower cost of labour 
allows exporters to sell goods and services at cheaper prices and allows these countries to 
attract foreign investment. The lowering of standards can also be used for protectionist 
purposes, insofar as a country may opt to reduce labour costs domestically in import 
competing sectors.
4
 There is also a related concern that, as the global economy becomes more 
integrated, firms may be tempted to move their production and processing facilities to where 
labour costs are lower.  This may then lead to a race to the bottom, as the adoption of lower 
standards in some countries would cause other countries to lower their own standards in order 
to counteract the supposed unfair competitive advantage gained by the former.
5
 Historically, 
the solution proposed to this perceived problem has been to use trade agreements to impose 
minimum standards of labour protection and enable trading partners to impose trade sanctions 
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against trading partners that fail to comply with or enforce such standards for protectionist 
purposes (so-called social clause
6
). The objective thus pursued is to iron out, or at least 
minimise, divergences in labour standards between countries.   
The ‘competitive advantage’ argument has been widely and heavily disputed for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that lower labour 
standards significantly affect trade flows or foreign investment.
7
 In this respect, studies have 
shown that, in developing countries, non-export industries tend to apply lower labour 
standards compared to export-oriented industries.
8
 In addition, the political economy literature 
is divided on the idea that low labour standards in some countries will lead to a race-to-the-
bottom.
9
 Whilst there is some evidence that investors in some sectors may be attracted to 
countries that maintain low labour rights, there is also evidence that low labour standards can 
constitute a deterrent to foreign investment.
10
 The race to the bottom contention is also 
problematic because it ignores the fact that domestic labour standards typically reflect 
differences in productivity as well as societal choices which depend on the level of economic 
development of a given country.
11
 Developed countries tend to adopt high standards of labour 
protection not only because there is there a political demand from their constituents to do so, 
but also because they are able to absorb the resulting costs. By contrast, many developing 
countries are simply not in a position to achieve “a trade-off between monetary and non-
monetary wealth”.12 Finally, the use of trade sanctions as a tool to coerce third countries to 
maintain minimum standards of labour protection has also been criticised, not least because 
such sanctions tend to produce adverse consequences for all parties involved: a trade sanction 
will invariably lead to price increases, which will simultaneously cause welfare costs for the 
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country applying the sanction and economic deterioration in the country subject to the 
sanction.
13
 
Given the conflicting evidence surrounding the economic arguments, some scholars 
have put forward value-related arguments to justify the trade-labour linkages.
14
 The argument 
here is that, to the extent that certain labour rights are also recognised as fundamental human 
rights, there is a moral imperative to withhold market access where countries fail to apply 
universally accepted human rights such as the prohibition of slavery or child labour.
15
 
However, this argument is limited by the fact that the claim to universality of such rights can 
be disputed. As explained by Bhagwati, the importance attached to particular rights often 
varies significantly depending on the cultural preferences and economic conditions of each 
country.
16
  Some have pointed to the success of the International Labour Organisation in 
setting minimum labour standards – evidenced by the large number of countries that have 
signed on to ILO conventions - an indication of a multilateral consensus on the fundamental 
labour rights.
17
 But this claim is countered firstly by the fact that developing countries have 
regularly contested the universality of rights recognized under the ILO
18
 and, secondly , that 
the ILO’s large membership is in part due to the fact that non-compliance with ILO standards 
does not lead to the imposition of any type of sanctions.
19
 This leads on to another problem 
with the values-based argument, which relates to the apparent double standards held by those 
countries promoting trade-labour linkages. Although many of the main proponents of the 
trade-labour linkages advocate the use of trade agreements to promote international labour 
protection standards, they themselves often fail to comply with international labour law 
obligations. The EU, Canada and the US, for example, have been shown to be in violation of a 
significant number of ILO standards”.20 The perception that is thus created, for those that 
would oppose the inclusion of labour issues in trade agreements, is that values-based 
arguments are merely intended to mask primarily economic agendas and that trade-labour 
linkages are viewed by developed countries merely as a tool to export labour rights to 
developing countries. 
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The above considerations show why the trade-labour linkage is by no means an 
uncontroversial issue. This is further demonstrated in the conflicting positions adopted by 
different WTO Members when discussing proposals for the incorporation of rules on labour 
within the remit of WTO law.
21
 These proposals were part of the wider efforts by developed 
countries in recent decades to go beyond the traditional focus in international trade law on 
tariffs and non-discrimination by addressing regulatory issues such as competition, 
procurement and investment, trade facilitation (so-called ‘Singapore issues’)22 as well as non-
trade issues such as environmental protection
23
. The WTO membership has, however, 
consistently rejected most of these proposals, in large part because developing country 
members have sought to maintain the organisation’s focus on traditional market access issues 
of importance to them and consistently opposed new regulatory issues which they see as 
attempts to erode regulatory autonomy.
24
 With respect to labour, the US has traditionally 
packaged their proposals in economic language based on ‘race to the bottom’ arguments.25 
Conversely, the EU has tended to promote trade-labour linkages by focusing on the normative 
dimension of the proposals and in particular by emphasizing the “universal nature of labour 
standards”.26 However, proposals for the negotiation of WTO rules on the relationship 
between trade and labour rights have long been rejected by developing country WTO 
Members because of the perception that the real objective pursued is to protect developed 
countries against the competitive advantage of the availability of low skilled labour in 
developing countries.
27
 
 
III. PAST FTA PRACTICE 
1. Labour protection in EU and US FTAs 
Whilst the EU and the US failed in their attempts to introduce labour standards within 
the framework of WTO law, they have been able to pursue this agenda in the context of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements, where they can leverage their market size more 
potently to secure concessions.
28
 Both EU and US FTAs include dedicated chapters with 
respect to labour standards, which tend to follow a fairly similar approach as far as labour 
protection is concerned.
29
 The overall aim is to use FTAs to promote and disseminate 
internationally recognised labour standards and to ensure that trading partners do not 
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deliberately weaken social protection in order to gain a competitive advantage in international 
trade.  
Firstly, they generally require parties to implement minimum internationally-
recognised labour standards. Such standards cover both labour rights (e.g., freedom of 
association, collective bargaining and the prohibition against child labour) and rules on 
working conditions (e.g., minimum wage and social security rights) enshrined in treaties 
negotiated under the auspices of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).
30
   
Secondly, the FTAs contain provisions requiring parties not to lower labour standards 
or refrain from enforcing such standards in order to attract foreign investment.
31
 Although the 
commitments to maintain and uphold levels of labour protection are phrased in strong terms, 
rather than as a best endeavour obligation, the normative implications of such provisions are 
not entirely clear. Firstly, broad references to ‘domestic labour laws’ indicate that these 
obligations go beyond the mere application and enforcement of minimum standards enshrined 
in the international instruments listed in the FTAs. The obligation is wide in scope in that it 
covers any form of domestic legislation relating to labour or environment protection issues. 
However, the agreements do not define more precisely what would constitute a labour law, 
nor do they list the laws of FTA parties that would be covered by such obligations.   
Another practical difficulty presented by such clauses is that they would only be 
applicable if the lowering of standards is designed “to affect” trade between parties or 
promote foreign investment. There is no guidance provided in EU or US FTAs clarifying how 
to determine the trade effects of the failure to apply or enforce labour standards, although in a 
recent decision delivered by the arbitral panel established in the context of a dispute between 
the US and Guatemala concerning the alleged violation of labour provisions under the 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)
 32
  -
the first arbitral ruling concerning labour provisions in a US FTA - it was ruled that “a failure 
to effectively enforce a party’s labor laws through a sustained or recurring course of action or 
inaction is ‘in a manner affecting trade between the Parties’ if it confers some competitive 
advantage on an employer or employers engaged in trade”.33 In doing so, the arbitral panel 
opted for a broad interpretation of the term “affecting trade” which rejects the notion that non-
enforcement can only ‘affect trade’ if it causes a change in prices of or trade flows in 
particular goods or services.
34
 Instead, the panel accepted that non-enforcement of domestic 
                                                          
30
 For a review of ILO standards see: Philip Alston, “Core labour standards’ and the transformation 
of the international labour rights regime”, European Journal of International Law 15.3 (2004): 457-521; Jordi 
Agustí-Panareda, Franz Christian Ebert, and Desiree LeClercq. "ILO Labor Standards and Trade 
Agreements: A case for consistency” Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. [2014] 36 347. 
31
 See  Samantha Velluti, “The EU’s social dimension and its external trade relations” in Axel Marx 
(ed.)  Global governance of labor rights - Assessing the effectiveness of transnational public and private 
policy initiatives (Edward Elgar, 2015): 42-62. Lorand Bartels, “Social issues: Labour, environment and 
human rights” in Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio and Lorand Bartels (eds), Bilateral and regional trade 
agreements: case studies - Volume II (Cambridge University Press, 2016),364;  
32
 Final Report of the Panel in the Matter of Guatemala - Issues Relating to the Obligations Under 
Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, 14 June 2017. Available at: 
http://trade.gov/industry/tas/Guatemala%20%20%E2%80%93%20Obligations%20Under%20Article%2016-
2-1(a)%20of%20the%20CAFTA-DR%20%20June%2014%202017.pdf. 
33
 Ibid Paragraph 190 
34
 Ibis Paragraph 165. 
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labour laws affecting a substantial number of workers for a significant amount of time could, 
on its own, be deemed to confer a competitive advantage on employers engaged in trade.
35
 
The substantive labour protection provisions of EU and US FTAs are complemented 
by procedural frameworks which are intended to ensure the implementation of these 
agreements and to promote future cooperation on labour matters that arise between the parties. 
The US FTAs establish Labour Affairs Councils composed of representatives of both parties 
who meet annually to discuss various issues pertaining to the implementation of a review of 
labour provisions.
36
  They also establish mechanisms for cooperative consultations that are 
intended to resolve labour related disputes amicably.
37
  The EU sustainable development 
chapters typically establish two separate cooperative frameworks.
38
 Such cooperative 
frameworks fit with the EU’s historically “soft” approach towards trade-labour linkages – that 
is, one that is based on continued dialogue and cooperation, rather than “hard” prescriptive 
rules. Firstly, the agreements create institutional bodies where cooperation between the parties 
can occur. This includes the requirement for each party to establish a contact point within each 
party’s administration which can be used by the other party in order to address queries 
regarding the implementation of the sustainable development chapter provisions. The 
agreements also create committees on trade and sustainable development composed of 
officials from each side. The task of these committees is to oversee the implementation of the 
agreement and discuss matters of common interest or any other matter within the scope of the 
chapters on a regular basis.
39
 The committees are then supplemented by advisory bodies which 
comprise independent representative organisations of civil society, representing labour groups, 
business organisations and other relevant stakeholders.
40
 These are consultative bodies which 
can be used by stakeholders to make recommendations on the implementation of sustainable 
development chapters.  
There are, however, some notable differences between the EU and the US approaches. 
Firstly, although both the EU and the US FTAs refer to ILO standards, the scope of standards 
covered by US FTAs is narrower than that of EU FTAs. US FTAs typically require parties to 
maintain laws, regulations and practices in accordance with the core labour standards 
established by the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
41
 These 
core standards represent minimum labour protection standards, which are also recognised as 
fundamental human rights and include the freedom of association, the elimination of all forms 
of forced labour, abolition of child labour and the requirement of non-discrimination with 
respect to employment and occupation.
42
 By contrast, the scope of EU FTAs often extends 
                                                          
35
 Ibid Paragraph 193. 
36
 Article 18(5) US-Australia FTA; Article Article 17(5 US-Colombia FTA; Article 16(4) CAFTA-
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37
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38
 See, for example, Articles 189 and 195 CEPA; Articles 13.12 – 13.15; Article 283-285 Colombia-
Peru FTA, Articles 294-297 EU-CA FTA; Article 13.15 EU-Singapore FTA. 
39
 Se, for example, Article 195 EU-CARIFORUM FTA; Article 13(3) EU-Korea FTA; Article 280 
EU-EU Colombia/Peru FTA. 
40
 See, for example, Article 13-13 EU-Korea FTA; Article 282 U-Colombia/Peru FTA; Article 238 
CETA. 
41
 Ferdi De Ville, Jan Orbie, and Lore Van den Putte, “Sustainable development in TTIP: a highest 
common denominator compromise?” European Journal of Risk Regulation 2 (2016), 291. 
42
 Robert Kissack, “Labour Standards. An Historical Account of the EU Involvement with (in) the 
ILO” in Amandaine Orsini (ed.) The European Union With (in) International Organisations: Commitment, 
Consistency and Effects Across Time (Ashgate, 2016): 76-77. 
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beyond core labour standards by also requiring parties to maintain laws in accordance with the 
ILO Decent Work Agenda
43
 and, in the case of the EU-Central America FTA, by requiring 
compliance with ILO conventions which regulate the core ILO standards, such as ILO 
Convention 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
and ILO Convention 98 concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise 
and to Bargain Collectively
44
. Such difference in scope between the EU and the US FTAs is 
explained to a large extent by the fact that that the US, unlike EU Member States, is not a 
signatory to most ILO Conventions.
45
With respect to the requirements to not derogate, waive 
or fail to enforce labour protection standards, there is one EU FTA that adds to this practice by 
providing that parties must not lower “the level of protection provided by domestic social and 
labour legislation”.46 This ‘non-lowering’ clause effectively requires parties to lock in existing 
levels of labour protection”.47  
However, the main difference between the EU and the US approach lies in the 
enforceability – or lack thereof - of such obligations. US FTAs adopt a “conditional 
approach”48, as they typically subject labour provisions to a dispute settlement mechanism and 
allow the suspension of benefits against a FTA party if it is shown that non-enforcement 
resulted from a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction and has occurred in a 
manner affecting trade or investment between the parties.
49
 By contrast, the EU adopts a 
“promotional” approach50, which places an emphasis on dialogue to promote labour standards 
and does not subject its sustainable development chapters to the FTA dispute settlement 
mechanisms.
51
 The upshot is that whilst the obligations included in these chapters are legally 
                                                          
43
 See Article 13(1) Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of 
the one part, and the Republic of Korea OJ L 127; Article 191(2) Economic Partnership between the 
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and the European Union and its Member States (CETA). The CETA was signed on 30 October 2016 and is 
currently awaiting approval from the European parliament. The parts of the agreement that fall under the 
EU’s exclusive competence will be provisionally applied once the European Parliament’s approval is 
secured. Those parts that fall within the EU’s shared competence will only enter into effect following 
ratification by each EU Member State. Text available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.  
 
44
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45
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46
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47
 Lorand Bartels, “Social issues: Labour, environment and human rights” in Simon Lester, Bryan 
Mercurio and Lorand Bartels (eds), Bilateral and regional trade agreements: case studies - Volume II 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016), 381. 
48
 Franz Ebert and Anne Posthuma, “Labour Provisions in Trade Arrangements: Current Trends and 
Perspectives”, ILO International Institute for Labour Studies Working Paper (2011), Geneva. 
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51
 The one exception to the rule is the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EU-
CARIFORUM EPA). The EU-CARIFORUM EPA subjects disputes concerning sustainable development 
provisions to its dispute settlement mechanism, although even in that case, the ability to suspend market 
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binding, the parties do not have the right to withdraw negotiated trade concessions in case of 
violations of labour rights by the other party. Instead, EU FTAs typically provide that where 
the parties are unable to resolve an issue regarding the sustainable development provisions, 
the parties may request that the matter be examined by a panel or group of experts,
52
 whose 
task it is to issue a report containing recommendations. Although these recommendations are 
not binding, the KOREU FTA,
53
 the Colombia-Peru FTA,
54
 the EU-CARIFORUM FTA,
55
 the 
EU-Singapore FTA
56
 and the CETA
57
 all provide that the sustainable development committee 
must monitor the implementation of the recommendations by the parties.  
The absence of ‘hard enforcement’ mechanisms in EU sustainable development 
chapters has been the focal point of an ongoing debate concerning the goal and effectiveness 
of these chapters. The European Parliament has consistently advocated the establishment of 
hard enforcement mechanisms in these agreements, in line with the existing US practice. In a 
2010 resolution, it proposed the need to provide “recourse to a dispute settlement mechanism 
on an equal footing with the other parts of the agreement, with provision for fines to improve 
the situation in the sectors concerned, or at least a temporary suspension of certain trade 
benefits provided for under the agreement, in the event of an aggravated breach of these 
standards”.58 These sentiments were recently repeated by the European Parliament when it 
stated that the provisions of the sustainable development chapters should be covered by a 
dispute settlement mechanism capable of issuing financial sanctions. However, the EU has 
rejected these proposals. Some have argued that the EU’s stance is justified by the general 
reluctance of the EU’s counterparts in trade negotiations to accept hard enforcement 
mechanisms in these fields.
59
 This would be consistent with the EU’s oft-stated commitment 
that its FTAs should reflect the needs and demands of its trading partners, rather than simply 
imposing the EU’s interest and values. As discussed, a number of countries do not look 
favourably upon trade-labour/environment linkages, and it has been reported these issues have 
proved controversial in the context of negotiations between the EU and developing 
economies.
60
  As previously mentioned, the EU has also suggested that imposing sanctions 
against developing countries for non-compliance with labour or environmental standards can 
be problematic in that they cause further economic harm to such countries.
61
 Viewed from this 
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perspective, the EU’s approach can be presented as evidence of its reluctance to engage in 
imperialistic practices by simply imposing its values on others through economic coercion. 
Such explanations, however, do not account for the omission of hard enforcement 
mechanisms in EU FTAs negotiated with trade partners that are not opposed to the 
enforcement of labour and environmental protection in trade agreements. A very recent 
example can be found in the EU’s refusal to allow for the imposition of sanctions in case of 
violation of the CETA’s sustainable development chapter despite the fact that Canada includes 
such provisions in its own FTAs.
62
 The CETA experience suggests that the EU is itself against 
the enforceability of the sustainable development chapters because of concerns that its own 
labour and environmental protection standards may be contested by its trade partners.
63
  
2. Impact of labour protection provisions in FTAs 
The question of whether the inclusion of labour provisions in FTAs actually leads to 
the adoption and enforcement of higher labour standards remains open. This is due in part to 
methodological challenges from the difficulty in establishing a causal relationship between the 
ratification of agreements and changes in labour conditions to the a lack of reliable data.
64
 
There is also a clear discrepancy between the effects of the inclusion of labour protection 
standards in FTAs on developed county and developing county FTA signatories. It has been 
noted that in North-North agreements, labour provisions have barely impacted on the domestic 
regulatory systems of signatories.
65
 For example, whilst the EU-Korea FTA requires parties to 
respect and realise the fundamental rights and principles contained in the ILO Declaration, the 
reality is that South Korea has been severely criticised for violating core labour rights and is 
yet to sign four of the eight core ILO conventions.
66
  
Assessing the impact of labour provisions in the context of FTAs between parties with 
power asymmetries is an altogether more complex task. With respect to the US, there is 
evidence that their FTAs have led to an improvement of labour rights protection in the 
territory of the signatories. For example, it has been  shown that US trade partners tend to 
increase their labour standards significantly during the FTA negotiation process.
67
 This is 
generally attributed to the fact that the opposition of the U.S. Democratic Party to the signing 
of trade agreements with countries with low labour standards typically acts as an incentive for 
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the latter to undertake significant domestic reforms.
68
  Such “pre-ratification”69 or “pre-
implementation” conditionality70 has proved highly effective in that it enables the US to 
demand domestic reforms as a pre-condition for the entry into force of negotiated trade.
71
 
However, whilst effective, this approach has also been the subject of some criticism, 
especially as the US has on a number of occasions demanded that its trading partners 
implement domestic reforms that were not initially provided for in trade agreements.
72
 
Moreover, although there is evidence that developing countries that have signed a trade 
agreement with the US have tended to experience improvements in the enforcement of labour 
laws after the entry into force of such agreements,
73
 there are also multiple examples of US 
FTA partners failing to comply with their labour law commitments.
74
 Whilst a number of 
submissions have been filed in relation to violation of labour provisions in US FTAs,
75
 only 
the aforementioned CAFTA-DR dispute has led to actual arbitration procedure and ruling. 
And even if the existence of a dispute settlement mechanism has enabled the US to exert 
pressure on FTA parties to address deficiencies in the enforcement of labour rights,
76
 the 
effectiveness of dispute settlement as leverage has clear limits. A good example of this can be 
found in the context of the Bahrain-US FTA.
77
 In 2011, the US Trade Labour Office received 
a complaint from US trade unions alleging that Bahrain had targeted trade union leaders for 
dismissal as a result of their political activities and, in doing so, had violated the freedom of 
association and the right to organise and bargain collectively.
78
 The complaint paved the way 
for the opening of consultations, but whilst Bahrain did eventually reinstate a number of 
dismissed trade union leaders,
79
 violations of labour rights have persisted in the country. The 
lack of political will and resource limitations of the competent US bodies to systematically 
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carry out investigations are the main reasons given for the weak monitoring and enforcement 
of labour provisions in US FTAs.
80
   
The picture is equally mixed with respect to EU FTA. Postnikov and Bastiaens have 
presented evidence that the cooperative frameworks established in EU FTAs and, in 
particular,that the increased involvement of civil society actors in these frameworks, has led to 
the improvement of labour rights in EU partner states.
81
 However, two more recent studies 
have shed light on the limitations of the EU’s sustainable development chapters, both in terms 
of the implementation of minimum labour standards and the effectiveness of cooperation in 
stimulating compliance with such standards. Firstly, in a study focusing on the operation of 
the EU-Peru FTA,
82
 Orbie and Van de Putte have demonstrated that that not only has Peru 
failed to implement core ILO Core Conventions listed in the agreement, it has also lowered 
domestic labour protections and failed to establish domestic mechanisms for CSO 
consultation.
83
 Secondly, a study conducted by Marx, Lein and Brando drew similar 
conclusions with respect to the EU-Colombia FTA, with criticisms levelled at the EU’s 
apparent soft-touch approach to monitoring compliance with labour commitments and 
questions being raised about the reduced incentive to comply with labour related provisions in 
this trade agreement in the absence of hard enforcement mechanisms.
84
 Both studies 
recommend the adoption of a more proactive approach to the monitoring of labour 
commitments, as well as the inclusion of hard enforcement mechanisms and trade sanctions as 
a “measure of last resort”85 to complement the EU’s cooperative approach.86 
In short, labour protection provisions included in EU and US FTAs have generally led 
to the adoption, and in some cases increased enforcement, of minimum labour standards. This 
has tended to be a one-way process, where large developed trade powers require smaller 
economies to implement higher standards of labour protection, whilst not subjecting 
themselves to similar disciplines. FTAs are therefore primarily being used to expand labour 
standards favoured by the EU and the US and, in doing so, to incrementally ratchet up 
standards. However, in both cases, the success of FTAs in improving labour conditions have 
been limited, in large part because the EU and the US have lacked either the political will or 
the resources to fully monitor,  implement and/or enforce the labour components of these 
agreements. 
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IV. TTIP AND TPP – CONSOLIDATION OF EXISTING TEMPLATE 
 
1. Mega-regionals – setting global rules and values? 
The near state of paralysis of the WTO since the collapse of the Doha Development 
round and the continued reluctance of the WTO membership to embrace the reform proposals 
put forward by larger industrialized nations has led the latter to shift their focus to other fora. 
In particular, free trade agreements have increasingly been used to promote the type of trade 
rules which have been continuously rejected by developing countries at the multilateral level 
since the 1990s. These “deep” FTAs regulate a host of issues, from technical norms, 
procurement, investment protection and intellectual property rights to social and 
environmental protection, which are largely untouched under WTO law. Initially these FTAs 
were mostly bilateral and concluded by and between developed and developing countries, 
where the former could use their superior bargaining power to push through their offensive 
economic interests and regulatory positions.
87
  
 
More recently, however, there has been a trend towards the negotiation of so-called 
mega-regional agreements, such as the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), Transpacific Partnership (TPP), and the China-backed Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP). These agreements are distinctive in terms of their 
geographical scale and the breadth and depth of topics addressed, and because of the goals 
that they pursue.  The rationale for mega-regional FTAs goes beyond the circumvention of 
stunted multilateral negotiations or the pursual of economic interests - it is also fueled by 
geopolitical concerns. This is the case of the TPP, a trade agreement that includes countries 
such as Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore and Japan, and was borne out of the 
US Obama administration’s choice to pivot its foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region 
to offset the mounting power of China.
88
 At the time, the TPP was seen not just as an 
opportunity to access the lucrative Asia-Pacific market, but also as a means to challenge 
China’s attempts to become the central actor in economic governance in the region.  
 
The negotiation of the TPP provided an incentive for the EU to also pursue its own 
mega-regional FTAs. This was in part due to the fact that the EU did not want to find itself in 
a position where its firms were being discriminated against in terms of accessing one of the 
biggest regional markets in the world, and on the outside of an agreement that would 
potentially set the benchmark for future trade rules.
89
 As a consequence, the EU decided to 
launch FTA negotiations with countries such as Japan, New Zealand and Austria and, 
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critically, to initiate talks with the US on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). Both the EU and the US framed the TPP and the TTIP as key instruments in the race 
with emerging economies, especially China, to define the future rules of international trade. In 
this light, the Obama administration stated that one of the main aims of the TPP was to set the 
“economic rules of the road before others will”90 and that these rules should “reflect 
America’s values”.91 This ‘values driven trade agenda’ placed a great deal emphasis on labour 
protection standards, with the TPP billed by its proponents as the “highest-standard trade 
agreement in history”, arguing that “TPP sets a global precedent for doing trade right”.92 A 
similar approach was followed on the other side of the Atlantic, where TTIP was described as 
being “about more than that economic boost, though. It is also about who will set global 
standards for the regulation of goods and services in the 21st century. TTIP would strengthen 
the hand of Europe and America in that process. And that means strengthening our shared 
Atlantic values, from the fundamentals of democracy and the rule of law, to key areas such as 
the environment and social standards”.93 For the EU, the TTIP offered the opportunity not just 
to enshrine existing labour protection standards but also to “go further than ever before in a 
bilateral trade agreement to promote these standards at home and abroad”.94 The TPP and the 
TTIP were therefore both being packaged as trade agreements that would raise the bar in 
terms of ensuring high standards of labour protection and would set the template for future 
trade agreements. 
 
2. Labour protection standards and the TPP  
The TPP was described in some quarters as a potential game-changer for social rights 
in US FTAs
95
. Like other US FTAs, the TPP includes a comprehensive chapter on labour 
issues which requires parties to generally adopt laws and regulations on ILO core labour 
rights, namely the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced labour or compulsory labour, the 
effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation.
96
 The agreement also includes broad obligations regarding 
domestic procedural guarantees, such as the requirement under Article 19(8) TPP to ensure 
that judicial proceedings for the enforcement of labour laws are fair, equitable and transparent, 
comply with due process of law and do not lead to unreasonable fees or time limits or 
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unwarranted delays. This obligation is then complemented by the standard non-derogation 
clause, which prohibits parties from weakening labour protections afforded in domestic 
legislation in order to encourage trade or investment, and an ‘enforcement clause’ requiring 
parties not to fail to enforce its laws through a sustained course of action or inaction.
97
  
There is nothing particularly original or novel about the aforementioned provisions, 
which borrow extensively from the text of past US FTAs. However, one area where the TPP 
could be said to potentially depart from past practice is the negotiation of a number of bilateral 
side agreements negotiated between the US and Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei – that is, those 
TPP parties which have been identified as maintaining relatively low labour standards and as 
having a poor record of ratifying ILO labour conventions.
98
 The side agreements provide that 
these countries must put into effect a number of reforms to their domestic regulatory systems 
in order to benefit from duty free access to the United States.
99
 Each of these side agreements 
contains detailed requirements for labour reforms that are specific to the concerned party. 
These include obligations to reform legislation on forced labour, child labour, protection of 
labour unions, union membership, collective bargaining, judicial proceedings and enforcement 
on labour matters. These side agreements are a de jure embodiment of the pre-ratification 
conditionality practice which, as discussed, has been employed to great effect by the US on 
several occasions in the past. It is a positive development from the perspective of the US’s 
trading partners, in that they provide clarity and security in terms of the domestic reforms that 
must be implemented in order to benefit from concessions negotiated in the trade agreement, 
and avoids situations whereby additional reform requirements could be added after the signing 
of FTAs depending on the political whims of the US Congress. 
From an institutional perspective, the TPP establishes a cooperative framework for the 
parties to discuss the implementation of the agreement as well as a variety of labour law issues 
both at a regional or multilateral level. The TPP establishes a Labour Council which would 
meet every two years unless decided otherwise by the parties, and counts among its functions 
the duty to agree on a general work programme concerning labour cooperation and capacity 
building activities, and to facilitate public participation and awareness of the implementation 
of the Labour Chapter.
100
 There is an obligation for each party to establish contact points to 
receive and consider written submissions from nationals of one the parties in relation to 
matters covered in the Labour Chapter which can then be reviewed by the TPP. The 
agreement follows past US FTA practice by a setting up a procedure allowing for bilateral 
cooperative dialogues between the parties
101
. Each party can make a written request to another 
party requesting a dialogue concerning a labour issue affecting trade or investment
102
. 
Through this dialogue, which must begin within 30 days from the submission of the written 
request, it is hoped that parties can collectively develop solutions to problems that arise from 
the lack of compliance and enforcement of labour laws, such as the development of action 
                                                          
97
 Article 19(5) TPP. 
98
 Brunei Darussalam – United States Labour Consistency Plan, 4 February 2016;  United States – 
Malaysia Labor Consistency Plan, 4 February 2016, United States – Government of the Socialist Republic of 
Viet Nam Plan for the Enhancement of Trade and Labour Relations, 4 February 2016. Available at: 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text.  
99
 Paragraph II Brunei Darussalam – United States Labour Consistency Plan; Paragraph II United 
States – Malaysia Labor Consistency Plan; Paragraph II United States – Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Viet Nam Plan for the Enhancement of Trade and Labour Relations. 
100
 Article 19(12) TPP. 
101
 Article 19(11) TPP. 
102
 Article 19(11) (2) TPP. 
16 
 
plans aiming at the promotion of labour inspections, independent verification of labour 
compliance and cooperative programmes and capacity building projects.
103
 Finally, all 
provisions of the Labour Chapter are subject to the TPP’s dispute settlement procedure. 
Firstly, parties can request labour consultations with another party if they identify a matter that 
requires adjudication, and if no solution is found, the requesting party may request the 
establishment of a panel.
104
 Such panel will have the power to issue a report determining 
whether a violation of the agreement has occurred, and in the event where a responding party 
fails to rectify the violation, the complaining power has the rights to suspend benefits derived 
from the agreement.
105
 Here, again, it should be noted that the institutional provisions of the 
TPP are generally in line with past US FTAs.  
3. Labour protection standards and the TTIP  
In 2015, the EU issued a textual proposal dealing, inter alia, with the labour aspects of 
the TTIP (Textual Proposal).
106
 The proposal was limited in scope, in so far as it did not deal 
with institutional issues such as civil society participation and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Instead, the proposal focuses exclusively on the promotion of substantive international labour 
norms, and in this respect at least, the EU has shown a willingness to build upon its existing 
template language. The proposal provides that each party must ensure that its laws and 
practices respect, promote and realise within an integrated strategy, in its whole territory and 
for all, the internationally recognised core labour standards which are the subject of ILO 
Conventions, namely: i) the freedom of association  and the effective recognition of the right 
to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced labour or compulsory labour; 
the effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation”.107 This requirement to comply with core labour standards is in 
line with previous EU and US FTA practice. However, the textual Proposal departs from such 
practice by providing detailed descriptions of the various principles that are subsumed in these 
rights and must be upheld by the parties, as well as by listing measures that must be adopted 
in order to put these rights into practice.
108
 For example, with respect to the freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining, Article 5 of the Textual Proposal enjoins 
each party to uphold and implement in their laws and practices the right to form and join trade 
unions and the inherent corollary of the right to strike, the right to establish and join 
employers’ organisations, the effective recognition of collective bargaining and effective 
social dialogue. In addition, the Textual Proposal also lists measures that must be put in place 
by the parties to ensure that these rights are realised in practice. Once more, in the area of the 
freedom of association, parties must implement effective policies and measures for social 
dialogue, for information and consultation of workers through dialogue, adequate protection 
against acts of anti-union discrimination, maintain the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce 
collective agreements, etc.
109
 This approach, which is replicated for all other core labour rights 
covered by the Textual Proposal, is designed not just to promote adoption and compliance 
with core labour rights, but also to set out in detail how such rights can be operationalised. In 
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relation to ‘working conditions’, the Textual Proposal is far less ambitious in that it merely 
provides a broad obligation to ensure the protection of health and safety at work and decent 
working conditions for all. There is no detailed description of how such standards can be 
implemented in practice, and only a very brief and non-exhaustive list of areas and issues that 
must be covered by domestic legislation (e.g., decent working conditions must relate to wages 
and earnings, working hours and other conditions in order to ensure a minimum living 
wage).
110
  
Beyond the dissemination of international norms, the Textual Proposal also follows 
current EU FTA practice by establishing by establishing a clear link between trade and labour 
standards. Article 7 of the Textual Proposal provides:  
1. The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce the 
levels of protection afforded in domestic environmental or labour laws in 
order to encourage, or in a manner affecting, trade or investment. 
2. A Party shall not waive or derogate from, or offer to waive or derogate 
from, its environmental or labour laws as an encouragement for, or in a 
manner affecting, trade or investment. 
2. A Party shall not, through a sustained or recurring course of action or 
inaction, fail to effectively enforce its environmental or labour laws as an 
encouragement for, or in a manner affecting, trade or investment. 
Paragraph 1 harks back to the EU-CARIFORUM EPA’s non-lowering clause. 
However, unlike the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, this clause is phrased in non-binding terms, 
merely stating that parties must “recognise that it is inappropriate to weaken or reduce the 
levels of protection”.111  With respect to paragraphs 2 and 3, this type of language, which is 
intended to prohibit parties from resorting to social dumping, can be found in other EU FTAs 
and is subject to a number of limitations, from the lack of clarity on the scope of labour 
provisions covered, to the difficulty in determining the causal link between derogation from 
standards and trade or investment and the absence of any enforcement mechanism.
112
 In short, 
barring a few additions, the Textual Proposal does not significantly deviate from standard EU 
FTA practice. The most notable change is that whilst not going as far as some EU FTAs 
which require the ratification and compliance with key ILO Conventions, the Textual Proposal 
would constitute an upgrade in terms of the minimum labour standards typically promoted in 
US FTAs.  
 
4.4  The collapse of TPP and TTIP and future of labour provisions in FTAs 
The analysis of both the text of the TPP Labour Chapter and the EU’s textual proposal 
for the TTIP shows that the EU and the US have sought to use mega-regional agreements to 
consolidate and disseminate their existing template for labour provisions in trade agreements. 
Neither text shows a willingness on the part of their proponents to innovate or depart 
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significantly from the existing boilerplate language included in EU and US FTAs. In this 
sense, at least, the mega-regionals can be viewed as the latest instalment in the ongoing 
attempts of large industrialised powers to use their increased bargaining powers in the context 
of bilateral or regional trade agreements to impose regulatory positions that were rejected at 
the multilateral level, with the aim of incrementally raising labour standards whilst reducing 
the ability of countries to lower the application and enforcement of such standards to gain a 
competitive advantage in trade. This approach is not necessarily shared by others. Whilst the 
EU and the US pursued the TPP and the TTIP, emerging economies and smaller developing 
economies have also been occupied with the negotiation of their own mega-regionals. China, 
for example, does not include labour provisions in its FTAs. When signing FTAs with 
developed countries, it has exceptionally agreed to sign side agreements which do not create 
substantive obligations but rather best endeavour commitments to enforce existing 
international and domestic labour law obligations and to consider cooperation in certain 
fields.
113
 China has spearheaded the negotiation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership, an agreement that encompasses 16 Asian countries (including Australia, India and 
Japan) but largely eschews regulatory issues such as labour protection standards
114
. Similarly, 
the negotiation of a Continental Free Trade Area launched by the African Union largely 
focuses on trade liberalisation and investment protection whilst ignoring labour issues 
altogether.
115
 This, of course, should come as no surprise, to the extent that emerging and 
developing economies were the main opponents to the introduction of trade-labour linkages 
within the fabric of WTO law.  In this sense, at least, the approach to trade-labour linkages 
adopted in mega-regionals largely mirrors the recent evolution of global trade governance and 
law. The venue for the negotiations of trade issues may have shifted from the multilateral to 
bilateral or regional settings, but the divisions and divergences which undermined reform at 
WTO level remain fundamentally the same.   
However, the US’s dalliance with mega-regional trade agreements seems to be at an 
end for the time being. On 23 January 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive 
order formally ending the US’ participation in the TPP.116 This followed a US presidential 
electoral campaign where President Trump routinely linked free trade and trade agreements 
with the loss of manufacturing jobs – a message that played very well with a significant 
portion of the US electorate - and vowed to radically change the US’s approach to negotiating 
trade agreements. As for the EU, the prospect of concluding the TTIP was always a remote 
one. The TTIP negotiations have from the very start been beset by relentless criticism from 
the public, civil society, and politicians in Europe, because of its perceived threat to the 
regulatory autonomy of the EU and its Member States. There were concerns regarding the 
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potential impact of the agreement on social and environmental standards, public services and, 
in particular, the potential of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism to 
undermine the ability of EU Member States to legislate in pursuit of public interest objectives. 
The inauguration of Donald Trump - who has expressed a certain degree of antipathy towards 
the EU and a far more mercantilist approach to trade negotiations than his predecessors – has 
only served to further reinforce the suspicion that the chances of a successful conclusion to the 
TTIP negotiations remain extremely remote at this point in time. 
What could be the impact of the demise of these mega-regional trade agreements on 
labour provision in EU and US trade agreements? At the time of writing, there is no indication 
that the US intends to substantively alter its approach with regard to the labour dimension of 
their FTAs. The current US administration has repeatedly signalled its intention to focus on 
the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements where it will be better placed to extract further 
concessions from its trade partners. Given the protectionist rhetoric adopted by this 
administration, it seems highly likely that the US will continue to require its trading partners 
to comply with minimum labour standards. Indeed, it may well wish to replicate the 
prescriptive approach to labour provisions developed in the TPP in future FTAs.  
On the other side of the Atlantic, whilst recent FTAs concluded by the EU have stuck 
to the usual template,
117
 there are also clear indications that the EU is willing to re-consider its 
approach to Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in EU FTAs. In a non-paper on 11 
July 2017,
118
 the European Commission signalled the intent to initiate a debate with the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers regarding the content of these chapters and, 
specifically, the question of their effective implementation and enforcement. The non-paper 
points to a series of concerns put forward by EU stakeholders on the functioning of the Trade 
and Sustainable Development chapters, from the lack of resources to implement the 
cooperative mechanisms to the non-usage of the dispute settlement mechanism foreseen in the 
chapters. In response to these criticisms, the EU puts forward two avenues for potential 
reform. The first option advocates continuity by proposing a “more assertive” stance to the 
current approach. For example, the non-paper suggests improving the complaints mechanisms 
by enhancing transparency of the process and clarifying steps to respond to inputs from 
stakeholders, improving the monitoring and follow up of sustainable development issues 
raised at governmental level, a more assertive use of the dispute settlement mechanism or 
improving the role of civil society organisations. This first option is not so much a reform 
proposal, as there are few suggestions that would lead to a substantive amendment of the 
existing EU FTA template. Rather it is an implicit recognition that the current trade and 
sustainable development chapters have not been effectively implemented. A rectification of 
this problem will in all likelihood necessitate an increase in the resources allocated to the 
European Commission and the EU’s trading partners to monitor compliance and make use of 
the cooperative frameworks established by the FTAs.  
Conversely, the second option would entail a considerable change from the current 
approach, as it opens the door for the use of trade sanctions in case of the violation of labour 
protection standards in a manner that affects trade. This is an approach that has been put 
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forward on different occasions by the European parliament and it is also one that would seek 
to provide an additional incentive for FTA parties to comply with the Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapters.  It is not, however, an option favoured by the European Commission, 
with much of the non-paper dedicated to highlighting some of the limitations of hard 
enforcement mechanisms relating to labour/environment protection obligations in FTAs. For 
instance, the European Commission points to the fact that complaints can only be levelled in 
cases of non-compliance with labour standards that have a trade disrupting effect, and that 
providing evidence of economic injury resulting from non-compliance can be a challenging 
task. It also refers to ILO studies positing that hard enforcement mechanisms in FTAs are 
largely ineffective, and argues that a sanctions-based approach may be perceived as too 
confrontational a tool by the EU’s trading partners, thus undermining the current emphasis 
placed by EU FTAs on the improvement of standards through long-term cooperation. The 
non-paper is thus subtly restating the European Commission’s stance on the issue of Trade 
and Sustainable Development chapters – favouring cooperation and dialogue – which is in 
opposition that of the European Parliament, which argues for a more prescriptive approach. It 
is noteworthy in this regard that the non-paper does not put forward a third option – one where 
the current approach followed in EU FTAs would be complemented by hard enforcement 
mechanisms found in the US and Canada models. The European Commission’s insistence on 
viewing conditional and promotional approaches as mutually exclusive, rather than potentially 
complementary, options seems odd in light of the concerns voiced regarding the lack of hard 
enforcement in agreements such as the EU-Colombia and EU-Peru FTAs
119
 and gives further 
credence to the suggestion that its aversion to hard enforcement mechanisms in this area is 
reflective of its concerns over the impact of sustainable development chapters on its own 
regulatory autonomy.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The TPP and the TTIP were both heralded by their proponents as an opportunity to set 
high standards and re-write the rules of the game in international trade. But when it comes to 
labour protection provisions, the reality is that the TPP and the textual proposals for the TTIP 
have not strayed far from the language typically found in recent EU and US FTAs. There is 
the odd innovation, such as the TPP side agreements, or the proposal for a non-binding non-
lowering clause in the TTIP, but there is ultimately nothing that marks a significant departure 
with past FTA practice. In this sense, at least, these agreements could be seen as attempts to 
consolidate existing FTA templates whose aims are to incrementally raise labour standards 
whilst reducing the ability of countries to lower the application and enforcement of such 
standards to gain a competitive advantage in trade. At the time of writing, it would appear that 
these attempts have failed, as the chances of either agreement being concluded or/and ratified 
by the EU and the US are fairly remote. Nevertheless, the texts of these agreements provide a 
clear indication of the continued commitment by these two trade powers to use trade 
agreements as a tool to disseminate labour protection standards and remove the flexibility 
available to others to adjust domestic standards in order to promote trade or investment. On 
the one hand, this fits with Hafner-Burton’s characterisation of the EU and the US as “liberal 
bullies, pushing for more economic liberalisation whilst at the same time forcing new 
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regulations that regulate human rights”.120 On the other hand, there is also a growing body of 
evidence that the EU and the US have devoted relatively little attention to the actual 
implementation and continued enforcement of labour provisions included in their FTAs, 
indicating that once the agreements enter into force, their impact on domestic labour 
conditions of the parties tends to be limited. The argument against a more prescriptive 
approach based on the removal of concessions in the event of non-compliance is that such an 
approach can bear imperialistic undertones and, in any case, that sanctions can be counter-
productive. But the fact that the disinclination of the EU and the US towards the use of hard 
enforcement mechanisms has also been accompanied by a lack of investment in resources to 
ensure the monitoring and implementation of the labour provisions in FTAs suggests that their 
commitment to use trade agreements to promote labour standards is, as things currently stand, 
half-hearted. For both then, and particularly the EU as it embarks on the review of its practice 
with respect to sustainable development chapters in FTAs, more consideration must be given 
to the development of mechanisms - from pre-ratification conditionality, hard enforcement 
mechanisms and increased investment on monitoring and capacity building - to improve the 
impact of these agreements on domestic labour conditions. 
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